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Research Highlights 
x Electronic performance monitoring has become a pervasive feature of performance 
management in technologically-intensive service work 
x Age stereotyping is shown in performance management based on electronic performance 
monitoring and forced distribution rating schemes.  
x Older workers are vulnerable to being designated as underperformers and targeted for 
Performance Improvement Plans and managed exit.  
  
4 
 
µ'HFRPPLVVLRQHG9HVVHOV¶± Performance Management and Older Workers in 
Technologically-intensive Service Work 
 
Abstract  
Despite increasing policy emphasis on developing and retaining an aging workforce, this 
paper demonstrates employer use of electronic performance monitoring (EPM) as part of 
performance management which can adversely affect older workers. We focus specifically on 
the use of EPM which is used to LGHQWLI\DSURSRUWLRQRIWKHZRUNIRUFHDVµXQGHUSHUIRUPHUV
, 
often referred to as forced distribution rating systems. Evidence is presented from union 
informants representing employees in two technologically-intensive service sectors: the 
financial sector and telecommunications. These sectors were amongst the first to utilize 
technology in a way which had transformative implications for work processes and people 
management in white-collar service work. In both sectors and across clerical and engineering 
work contexts, the data show the use of EPM by managers to guide punitive performance 
management for sickness absence and perceived reduced capability. Older workers emerge as 
a vulnerable group, with manager decisions shown to be based on age stereotypes. We argue 
that increasingly pervasive use of digitized performance monitoring may intensify age 
discrimination in performance management. 
 
Keywords 
 
Performance management; Electronic performance monitoring (EPM); Age; Age 
stereotyping; Electronic Human Resource Management (e-HRM) 
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µ'HFRPPLVVLRQHG9HVVHOV¶± Performance Management and Older Workers in 
Technologically-intensive Service Work 
 
1 Introduction 
Previous technological forecasting focused on the impact of the (then) neglected service 
sector (Miozzo and Soete, 2001). Technological and organizational innovations in software, 
control systems, integrated circuits and telecommunications made it possible to generate, 
analyze and diffuse large quantities of information at minimal costs. This rapid convergence 
of technologies had transformative implications for business structure and digitization in 
white-collar service work, especially in financial services and telecommunications (Howcroft 
and Richardson, 2012). 
These transformations simultaneously facilitated the digitization of human resource 
management (HRM) activities. Electronic HRM (e-HRM), encompassing both administrative 
(e.g. attendance management) and managerial activities (e.g. performance management), has 
reached an advanced level of adoption (Strohmeier and Kabst, 2009). However, recent 
research cautions that it brings new risks as well as opportunities (Parry and Strohmeier, 
2014).  This paper focuses on the increasing use of digitized data as an integral part of 
performance appraisals. One outcome of this practice is more rigorous identification of 
underperformers and their subjection to improvement and/or disciplinary measures (Taylor, 
2013). We propose that the increased use of such metrics presents a risk with respect to the 
fair treatment of older workers. 
Pressurized outcomes for employees do not ineluctably follow from the capacity of 
the technologies to deliver the metrics. It is their capacity within contexts that matters; 
notably competitive markets, the imperatives of cost-cutting and austerity, the need to lean 
processes and to downsize. Under conditions of inter-sectoral competition in the finance 
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sector (banking and insurance) and telecommunications and of tightened cost constraints 
following the crash of the dot.com bubble, micro-management was bound up with intensified 
targets for individual workers (Carter et al, 2011). Thus, a changed direction in HRM policy 
(Thomspon, 2011) in the post-2008 context of cost cutting and downsizing has motivated the 
wider adoption of system-generated statistics reflecting individual performance.  
 Recession and economic restructuring is thought to make older workers more exposed 
WR µRSSRUWXQLVWLF GRZQVL]LQJ¶ 0LQda, 1997). During the most recent economic downturn, 
there is already evidence that lawsuits related to age discrimination have increased 
(Rothenberg and Gardner, 2011). More easily accessible, integrated digitized performance 
data presents further, and as yet under-researched, challenges for older employees due to the 
potential for misuse as part of wider performance management (PM) systems. Our study 
focuses on financial services and telecommunications, sectors which embody the rapid 
digitization of work processes (Miozzo and Soete, 2001) and, simultaneously, HR activities 
such as PM. We pose two research questions: (1) what is the nature of digitized metrics used 
for performance evaluation in technologically-intensive service work, and (2) what evidence 
is there that this aspect of e-HRM for performance management potentially adversely affects 
older workers? 
We begin by considering the nature of electronic performance monitoring in service 
work, and the potential for age-related stereotyping when used in performance evaluations. 
Section 3 locates stereotyping within the wider context of changing HRM practice and 
presents evidence that PM is increasingly being used as a tool for WKHµmanaged exit¶ of older 
workers. Sections 4 and 5 present our study and data based on evidence from retail banking 
and telecommunications, and section 6 discusses how the findings extend our understanding 
of the digitization of HRM within technologically-intensive white collar service work with a 
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particular concern for older workers. The paper concludes with the implications for practice 
and policy directed at supporting an aging workforce.  
 
2 Electronic performance monitoring and age  
Electronic performance monitoring (EPM) of indicators such as speed, accuracy and errors 
provides substantial operational advantages for managers in terms of immediacy and 
consistency of reporting. The socio-technical environment of the call (or contact) centre was 
an early manifestation of such pervasive monitoring in service work (Bain et al, 2002). 
Digitized management information systems churned out a plethora of statistics, including 
Average Handling Times, call waiting or queuing times, and µQRWUHDG\¶DQGZUDSWLPHV. Key 
Performance Indicators in the form of Service Level Agreements became yardsticks against 
which employee performance was evaluated.  
An example of the software which generated the statistics upon which performance 
targets were based was 6LHPHQV¶%OXH3XPSNLQ7D\ORUDQG%DLQ7KLVSDFNDJHhad 
the capability, simultaneously, of optimizing staffing levels, scheduling workflows, 
measuring output and monitoring adherence, as well as calibrating the µSUHFLVH¶QXPEHUVRI 
operators required to meet demand, enabling costly µQRQ-HQJDJHG¶ labour to be eliminated. 
Contemporary systems incorporate similar technologies, but are more extensive in their span 
of control (e.g. Verint, 2014). Parallel innovations occurred in retailing through electronic 
point of sales technologies, and in the increasingly digitized back office (Boreham et al, 
2008).  
 On the one hand, EPM is positive for older workers. Diminishing physical or 
cognitive capacities become less relevant with increasing automation (for physical work) and 
computerization (e.g. for memory or computation tasks). Objective criteria also are less prone 
to stereotyping than subjective ratings. For example, supervisors tend to rate older 
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subordinates¶SHUIRUPDQFHlower than younger subordinates doing the same job regardless of 
qualifications (Latham and Mann, 2006), commonly due to stereotypes concerning 
characteristics such as emotional resilience (Rauschenbach, et al, 2012).  
On the other hand, there is evidence of a spillover effect from objective measures, 
such as sales volume, to subjective evaluations (Bol and Smith, 2011). Supervisors are prone 
to HYDOXDWLRQµKDOR¶RUµKRUQ¶HIIHFWV, where performance on one criterion influences a rating 
of another (e.g. timekeeping) either positively or negatively, respectively. Underlying such 
judgments are further cognitive biases. For example, ROGHUHPSOR\HHV¶SRRUSHUIRUPDQFH LV
more likely to be attributed to stable causes (e.g. age-related cognitive decline) and younger 
HPSOR\HHV¶SRRUSHUIRUPDQFHWRFRQWUROODEOHFDXVHVHJD ODFNRI MRENQRZOHGJHZKLFKLV
trainable) (Cox and Baier, 2014).  
EPM also narrows the focus to task performance, ignoring discretionary behaviours, 
such as organizational citizenship behaviour. Age is generally thought to be an advantage for 
the latter (Ng & Feldman, 2008). As performance targets become more quantifiable in terms 
of volume, speed, errors or physical/cognitive effort, appraisals are less likely to consider 
GLVFUHWLRQDU\ EHKDYLRXUV EDVHG RQ YDOXHV RU µVRIWHU¶ VNLOOV Wells, Moorman and Werner, 
2007). This shift adversely affects older workers in performance evaluations. More generally, 
EPM is recommended only for developmental purposes given its potential to intensify work 
pressure and increase stress (McNall and Roch, 2007; Stanton, 2000). 
 
3 Performance management and the older worker 
The dominant discourse of performance management (PM) recommends transparent 
performance evaluations which facilitate development and reward 3XODNRV DQG 2¶/HDU\
2011). Underperformance is managed with feedback and support, while rater subjectivity is 
overcome through appropriate procedures, for example, by gathering performance data from 
9 
 
multiple sources. This paradigm has come under increasing strain with pressures for 
efficiency-enhancing HRM systems. EPM and software generating organizational triggers 
that drill down to the individual have combined to produce performance improvement and 
punitive sickness absence measures (Taylor, 2013). In the UK, compromise agreements 
(CIPD, 2011) provide payments to terminate employment without redress to claims in 
employment tribunals.  
One controversial PM approach is the forced distribution rating system (FDRS) which 
focuses on relative rather than absolute individual performance appraisals differentiating 
high, average and low performers. While rewarding the best, FDRSs also terminate a 
percentage of underperformers annually in order to revitalize organizations. Such systems 
were prevalent in the US, despite litigation on age-related employment discrimination 
(Osborne and McCann, 2004), and negative outcomes; e.g. perceived unfairness and turnover 
intentions (Blume, Baldwin and Rubin, 2009), especially when terminations are involved 
(Lawler, 2003).  
Older workers are especially vulnerable to practices aimed at workforce reductions 
(Armstrong-Stassen and Cattaneo, 2010; Perry and Finkelstein, 1999). In comparison to those 
in early-middle career, they are considered more costly, and generally less healthy, creative, 
technologically proficient, and willing to learn (Posthuma and Campion, 2009). Yet, only one 
feature - ROGHUZRUNHUV¶JUHDWHUUHOXFWDQFHWRSDUWLFLSDWHLQWUDLQLQJDQGFDUHHUGHYHORSPHQW± 
is substantiated by empirical evidence (Ng and Feldman, 2012). Thus, in studies of employer 
treatment of older employees, voluntary redundancy programs emerge as µGLJQLILHG¶ H[LW
strategies or as ways RIµPDQDJLQJSHRSOH¶VDVSLUDWLRQVIURPIRUZDUG¶ (Loretto and White, 
2006: 323). Retirement has often been regarded DVDµEHQLJQSHUIRUPDQFHPDQDJHPHQWWRRO¶
(Manfred and Vickers, 2013); but as this option is gradually eroded by pressures on pension 
systems, stricter PM policies may be used IRUµPDQDJHGH[LWV¶ 
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 Such an approach to PM sits in direct contrast to appeals for age-aware HRM (Kooij, 
et al, 2013). For example, employers are encouraged to adopt practices which prevent health 
deterioration; e.g. adapting work schedules and workload (EHRC, 2010). Longitudinal 
studies indicate that lower mental and physical work-related strain in mid-career maintains 
µZRUN DELOLW\¶ LQ PLG WR ODWH FDUHHU, which in turn predicts sickness absence and health 
(Härmä, 2011). However, employers seem reluctant due to cost considerations to maintain 
good quality of working life for those in the later stages of their careers (White, 2012). 
Enlarged work demands, which have been shown to be associated with technologically-
intensive work (Green, 2006), lead to increased job strain and health problems ± significant 
µSXVK¶factors out of employment for older workers (Robroek, et al, 2013).  
Such trends, arguably, also amplify managerial stereotypes that work-related stress 
increases with age (Rauschenbach, et al., 2014), making older workers vulnerable within 
target-driven PM systems. The additional effect of EPM, with its potential for age 
stereotyping based on a narrow measure of performance, has yet to be explored. 
 
4 Research questions 
PM based on EPM has the potential to adversely impact older workers due to its emphasis on 
task performanceVXSHUYLVRUV¶age stereotyping, and its use within a target-driven context of 
cost-cutting and downsizing. Financial services and telecommunications, sectors which were 
amongst the first to witness the transformation of white-collar service work (Miozzo and 
Soete, 2001), provide apposite exemplars of work which is subject to EPM. Thus, we 
consider: (1) what is the nature of digitized metrics used for performance evaluation in 
technologically-intensive service work and (2) what evidence is there that this aspect of e-
HRM for PM adversely affects older workers?  
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5 Methods 
5.1 Data sources 
The data derives from a wider study (2009-2013) investigating the impact of PM on 
employees in four retail banks (Banks A, B, C, D) and one telecommunications company 
(Telco). Telco commands a dominant share of the UK telecommunications market while that 
for retail banking is more evenly distributed amongst a number of players. The banks are four 
of the five largest UK retail banks following late-1990s/early 2000s and post-2008 crisis 
restructuring, and responsible for almost 80 per cent of the value of activity in the sector.      
We approached the research questions through the lens of the trades unions 
representing financial services and telecommunications workers. Primary data was drawn 
from several sources. First, semi-structured interviews were conducted with national and 
regional full-time officers (FTOs), seconded and lay representatives, and branch officers of 
three trades unions
i
 (Unite the Union, &RPPXQLFDWLRQ :RUNHUV¶ Union [CWU] and 
Prospect), the former organization with members in financial services and the latter two with 
members in Telco. Data for this article comes from 30 interviews (Table 1), 15 from the 
finance sector and 15 from telecommunications. The national officers were those directly 
involved in consultation and/or negotiation with their respective companies on terms and 
conditions that would involve matters relating to performance, grievance and discipline. The 
reps were broadly typical of the defined groups in these companies, in terms of length of 
service, experience, gender, area of work and level of engagement with management on 
performance issues.  
Table 1 here 
The interview schedule asked respondents to reflect on when they had become aware of PM 
in their representative capacity. Questions covered the nature of PM and decision-making. 
Specifically, they addressed: (1) the role of technology in performance monitoring and 
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evaluation; (2) target-setting and measurement/rating of behaviours/attitudes; (3) use of 
forced distribution rating systems, definitions of underperformance and the nature of 
Performance Improvement Plans; and (4) PM¶VHIIHFW on the workforces for whom the union 
respondents had responsibility. The latter question was followed by probes on work intensity, 
job (in)security, stress and ill-health, and whether, in their experience, particular groups of 
workers (gender, age, disability, ethnicity) were  more susceptible to disciplinary measures. 
Thus, the question of age was not isolated a priori. Respondents were given room to indicate 
which groups might be affected by PM.   
A second data source came from union conferences, seminars and meetings at which 
PM was either the single agenda item, the subject of a dedicated session or a significant topic 
of debate (Table 2). Detailed notes were taken in all and relevant debates recorded. This is 
unprompted testimony, the outcome neither of specific questions, nor of scheduled 
discussions. Union conferences provide windows into the workplace and a voice mechanism 
for large numbers of employees. Delegates at Unite WKH8QLRQ¶VILQDQFLDOsector conference 
represented 114,000 employees, and those at WKH &:8¶V WHOHFRPV FRQIHUHQFHs more than 
100,000 members.  
A third source providing some triangulation is company and union documentation. 
The former include PM guidelines and handbooks for employees and managers, pro forma, 
progress schedules, procedural agreements and other HR papers. Such documents must be 
interpreted critically because practice may diverge from policy prescription. Union 
documents include circulars and briefings for members, newspapers, digital media, 
conference resolutions and proceedings, guidelines, codes of practice and company 
correspondence.  
Using Pawson anG 7LOO\¶V  WHUP union informants are µPHFKDQLVP H[SHUWV¶. 
Workplace reps are close observers of managerial initiatives, highly attuned to the concerns 
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of their members and fellow ZRUNHUV5HSVDQGOD\RIILFHUVµUHIOHFWWKHG\QDPLFRIFKDQJH¶LQ
organizational life (Danford et al, 2003), articulating workforce concerns to management. 
Full-time officers, while not immersed in day-to-day workplace realities, negotiate with 
companies over PM SXUVXLQJ PHPEHUV¶ LQWHUHVWV DQG acting on conference mandates. 
Together, these union actors convey the experiences of a broad employee population.  
Certain limitations must be acknowledged. Union sources perforce will deliver a 
perspective that is partial. If the objective had been to deliver an holistic organizational 
account of the dynamics and consequences of PM, then it would be legitimate to regard the 
data as µLQFRPSOHWH¶ However, the objective was to evaluate experiences of PM in 
technologically-intensive service sector cases, as articulated through the medium of union 
officers and reps. It is acknowledged that such an approach focuses on PM as grievance and 
the perspective of one stakeholder representing a selected group of employees. Rather than 
indicating bias, though, the data provides a particular and entirely legitimate perspective on 
PM and its effects on employees, as reported by representatives with knowledge of 
vulnerable member groups.    
Table 2 here 
 
5.2 Data analysis 
Interview and meeting/speech transcripts were analyzed to evaluate the frequency of EPM 
(e.g. individual targets for speed or volume), forced distribution rating systems (FDRS) and 
punitive outcomes (e.g. PM disciplinary hearings, Performance Improvement Plans (PIPs), 
dismissals). We used theory-generated and emerging codes (Ryan and Bernard, 2000) to 
identify common themes across cases and sectors (e.g. DJHVWHUHRW\SLQJµKRUQ¶HIIHFWV). For 
each informant interview, we identified whether older workers were highlighted as vulnerable 
before assessing the scale and consistency of reported experiences for each sector.  
14 
 
 
6 Results 
Older workers were not the only employee category union respondents identified as having 
been particularly affected by PM, however, they were the most frequently cited. Moreover, in 
several cases when interviewees emphasized gender (that women were more likely to be 
affected than men), it was the combination of gender and age that mattered with the latter 
being more important. The results, therefore, focus on EPM and PM generally for older 
workers. 
 
6.1 Financial Services 
A majority of interviewees (10 of 15) referred to a step change in PM facilitated by the 
growth of EPM. A Senior Rep provided vivid testimony.  
The call centre was the testing ground in a way, with our members being hit with 
stats, stats, stats ± call waiting, timing, targets ± all measured by the 
system«managers would come to meetings with numbers against every single team 
member. The system would do the counting, the line managers would enter the 
figures on the spreadsheets and team leaders would do the enforcing. (Bank A, Senior 
Rep) 
The banks demonstrated similarity in the chronology by which technologies had been 
implemented for PM in both front and back office. Analysis of company documentation (e.g. 
guidelines for the conduct of appraisals, employee handbooks) provides evidence of close 
comparability in policy and practice (see Taylor, 2013 for detail). For example, three of the 
four banks utilized a five-category distribution for the purposes of appraisal, and while the 
terminology might vary HJ µH[FHOOHQW¶/µJUHDWO\ H[FHHGV H[SHFWDWLRQV¶ DW WKHKLJKHQG DQG
µXQGHUSHUIRUPHU¶/µQHHGVLPSURYHPHQW¶DWWKHERWWRPWKHFULWHULDGHWDLOHGDQGWKHSHUFHQWDJH
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of the workforce (or sections thereof) allocated to each category were analogous. Forced 
distribution (explicit or indicative) applied in each case, and underperformance resulted in 
some form of corrective action, whether designated Performance Improvement Plan (PIP), 
Performance Improvement Measure (PIM) or Individual Improvement Plan (IIP).  
 A National Secretary reflected generally on the changes PM had brought to work and 
to older workers.  
As I was out of the sector between 2007 and 2010, I have the benefit of perspective. 
Before I left PM was emerging as a difficulty. Managers were using Management 
Information Systems to generate metrics, which were giving us underperformers right 
across the banking sector. The banks denied using forced distribution. Some senior 
managers let it slip they were and sympathetic ones told us off the record. The facts 
spoke for themselves ± the numbers on improvement measures, the numbers 
failing«When I returned, it was much more obvious«insecurity among good people 
like never before, frightened of being managed out. In [Bank C] 10% were on a PIP. 
We challenged them, but it was a downsizing strategy. What stood out was the plight 
of staff in their 50s and older who were getting the treatment. Supposedly, they were 
slower, not tech savvy enough, too careful, but this was nonsense. To use an analogy 
it was like perfectly good navy vessels being de-commissioned. (National Secretary 
1) 
Twelve of the 15 financial services¶ interviewees reported that older workers had either 
become a specific target for PM or were being treated differentially in a more punitive 
manner. This observation of Bank C was typical.  
Anybody over 50 was a target group. Previously they would say to the workforce, 
µ5LJKWDQ\ERG\RYHUVWLFN\RXUKDQGXSIRU9ROXQWDU\5HGXQGDQF\DQG\RXFDQ
JR¶7KH\ZRXOGMXVWVKXIIOHWKHboard and the players about to fill the gaps but they 
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FDQ¶W GR WKDWQRZ IRU OHJDO UHDVRQV1RZ WKH\ JHW Uid of people in a different way, 
they get performance managed out. (Bank C, Senior Rep) 
One National Officer described how reconfigured PM procedures µWUDSSHG¶ YXOQHUDEOH
categories of worker.  
Performance management changed as the maximizing performance thing kicked in. A 
level three rating is where you have overall achieved - straightforward, yoX¶YHGRQH
what the business has asked of you. But they shifted it to all areas. To get a level three 
rating you had to now achieve all objectives, all targets, all behaviours....It was 
massively subjective. You could see older colleagues falling down on behaviours or 
attitudes or a physical target. Previously they would have been a three. I think it was 
deliberately set up to manage out older more expensive workers when the company 
was downsizing. Do I think it was discrimination? Yes. Could we prove it? It was 
very hard to. (Bank B, National Officer) 
These views meshed with the direct experiences recounted by worker delegates. PM was 
raised at all the company conferences and at the National Sector Conferences of Unite the 
Union. The following extract IURP D GHEDWH DW %DQN $¶V FRQIHUHQFH was typical at all the 
conferences attended when PM was the subject of discussion.   
,W¶VEHHQ WKUHH \HDUVRI OLYLQJKHOO In the head office my section was re-organized, 
merged with another one«We were left with a smaller number doing twice the work. 
It was a cull of older cROOHDJXHVEXWWKHEDQNGLGQ¶WSD\YROXQWDU\VHYHUDQFHWKH\GLG
it through managing performance and compromise agreements...But these were the 
experienced people who had more knowledge, you used to go to them for all sorts of 
WKLQJVEXWWKH\¶YHJRQHBank A, Head Office Clerical Worker, Global Conference, 
13 May 2011) 
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It¶V similar in the branches, although here it¶VEHHQ closure and merger. You 
go into the branches and you can see the result ± front of house, back of house, mostly 
young, happy shiny people. About two and a half years ago there was this [takes deep 
breath] shock and awe when they began using managed performance up to the hilt. 
You could see the oldies ± some ZHUHQ¶WWKDWROG- dropping like flies, put on 1s or 2s 
and for many it was 6 to 8 weeks from on a PIP to out the door, mostly women, 
SHUIHFWO\ JRRG DW WKHLU MRE 7KH\¶YH NHSW D WRNHQ QXPEHU EXW WKDW¶V NLQG RI OLNH
window dressing. (Bank A, Bank Branch, Global Conference, 13 May 2011) 
In 2011, related motions on targets, work intensification and PM were unanimously passed. 
Motions 12 and 13 FRQGHPQHG µIRUFHG GLVWULEXWLRQ¶ DQG µVHFUHWLYH FDOLEUDWLRQ PHHWLQJV¶
which were FDXVLQJµKHLJKWHQHGMRELQVHFXULW\¶, µZRUN-UHODWHGVWUHVV¶DQGµDQLQFUHDVHLQPM 
disciplinary hearings and dLVPLVVDOV¶ 7KHVH µIXQGDPHQWDOO\ IODZHG¶ SROLFLHV DQG SUDFWLFHV
were discriminatory, as contributors to the debate made clear: 
The most vulnerable people are being harassed, those who some managers think they 
FDQJHWDZD\ZLWKEXOO\LQJ,W¶VLQKXPDQH6RPHWLPHVLW¶VZRPHQPD\EHLIWKH\¶YH
EHHQRIIVLFNRUZLWKIDPLO\GHPDQGVVRPHWLPHVLW¶VWKRVHZLWKDPHGLFDOFRQGLWLRQ
VRPHWLPHV LW¶V WKRVH ZKR WKH\ NQRZ DUH D ELW TXLHW DQG ZRQ¶W ILJKW EDFN EXW the 
common thing is that they are a bit older, not necessarily old, but a bit older. They get 
dumped in the underperforming EXFNHW DQG FDQ¶t climb out, but that is the overall 
objective, not to improve them but to exit them (North West Delegate). 
In short, our case studies revealed that older employees were likely to receive (similarly) 
differential treatment in each of the banks. One of the National Secretaries concluded,  
Sometimes we get asked to come up with examples of best practice for inequality and 
disability audit. When it comes to PM we have to say there are none and specifically 
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older workers are subject to bad practice, right across the piece. No bank is better than 
an another because they are all doing the same. (National Secretary 2)  
 
6.2 Telecommunications 
Telco¶V clerical functions consisted mainly of call centres which underwent a similar 
trajectory in terms of the adoption of computer-telephonic technology as did financial 
services (Batt and Moynihan, 2002). An earlier phase of aggressive target implementation 
using EPM created widespread grievance, leading to industrial action in 1999. On the manual 
side, notably field engineers, jobs had been more recently reconfigured and re-timed, leading 
to a prioritization of the number of completed cases at the expense of quality of work. 
Technological controls and EPM took multiple forms, including internet location 
management (iLM) devices that provided the statistical data for disciplinary outcomes. The 
CWU magazine, over several years, has reported concerns ZLWKWKHDEXVHRIµWUDFNHUGDWD¶
(e.g. 2014: 9). In sum, employees in Telco¶s distinctive areas of work had their performance 
ranked and stacked according to categories, similar to financial services, with the bottom 
underperforming category subject to improvement or corrective action in the form of PIPs. 
The outcome, as evidenced by all of the interviews and by union conference debates (CWU 
and Prospect) was extensive grievance with EPM because of disciplinary outcomes, including 
µPDQDJHGH[LWV¶ for designated underperformers.     
 In general, the interviews with both CWU and Prospect respondents indicated two 
themes affecting older workers. First, they are adversely affected by EPM¶V IRFXV RQ
narrower targets and, second, they are one of the most vulnerable groups to punitive PM 
systems. The evidence for supervisory grades from Prospect is illustrative. A survey of 4,055 
members (Prospect, 2013) showed that those aged over 50 were less likely to be highly 
ranked than those under 50 (15 versus 23 per cent) and more likely to be lower ranked (19 
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versus 16 per cent). The vulnerability of older workers is reflected by the following 
interviewee. 
I have lost count of the times I have seen the sorry cycle repeated. The targets get 
PRUH µDJJUHVVLYH¶, to use the managers¶ZRUG, and some of the older women really 
VWUXJJOHWRPDNHWKHLUWDUJHWV'RQ¶WJHWPHZURQJ± these people are not passengers, 
they are great with the customers«but they are not firing through the calls quickly 
HQRXJK,W¶VYHU\VDGEHFDXVHWKHVHDUHUHDOO\FRPPLWWHGSHRSOH7KH\internalize the 
problems and start making mistakes as they never did before. They end up on a PIP 
which they find very difficult to get out of. (Branch Secretary 2) 
For clerical, mainly contact centre, work, a majority of respondents (10 of 15) reported 
increasing numbers of advisors presenting with symptoms of stress. A common theme was 
that longer-serving employees were most affected.  
They [advisors] are coming to us complaining that they are not able to sleep and are 
stressed, worrying about their perfoUPDQFH :H¶UH VSHDNLQJ KHUH DERXW SHRSOH ZKR
have been with the business for 20, 25 or even 30 years, people now in their 50s. I 
was used to getting women and men on a daily basis in my office in tears ± more 
women than men. They were older and had been defined by management as 
underperformers...The pressure stacking up on people is immense and is very difficult 
to withstand. The older people are crumbling before our eyes. (Clerical Branch 
Officer, CWU) 
Officers responsible for engineering and manual grades reported similar trends. 
, WKLQN LW¶V WUXH WR VD\ WKDW ILHOG HQJLQHHUV¶ ZRUNLQJ OLYHV KDYH EHHQ WXUQHG XSVLGH
down in the last few years. They used to have a number of jobs to do and they could 
pace themselves, finishing when they got them done. Now all the jobs have standard 
times, timed to the minute. In the vans they have lap tops to log on to receive jobs and 
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JLYH UHSRUWV WKH\ KDYH *60 WUDFNLQJ WR VWRS WKHP GHYLDWLQJ DQG WKHQ WKHUH¶V WKH
mobile phones for chasing them. (CWU National Officer 3)  
Very often those who fall foul of PM, the underperformers, are actually the 
good engineers. They tend to be older, a bit slower and are not doing enough jobs per 
GD\ 0DQDJHPHQW VD\ WKDW WKH\ µRYHU-HQJLQHHU¶ MREV EXW \RX FDQ¶W HYHU JHW D
definition of over-engineering. Now engineers have got high quality and safety 
VWDQGDUGV WR PHHW DQG WKH\ ZDQW WR DYRLG WKLQJV OLNH µHDUO\ OLIH IDLOXUHV¶ ZKLFK
HQJLQHHUVDUHDOVRWDUJHWHGRQ ,W¶VDGLIILFXOWEDODQFLQJDFWDTXDOLW\MREHYHU\WLPH
while meeting volume targets. (CWU Regional Officer) 
Once again, it was older workers who were reported to be suffering most from the pressures 
of EPM.  
People who are about ten years or so from finishing - all they want to do is come to 
work, keep their noses clean, do a good job, look forward to retiring and their 
pension. Now they are frightened because they know they can be caught in a trap if 
WKH\ PDNH RQH VOLS DQG GRQ¶W KLW WKH WDUJHWV 7KH\ ORRN DERXW DQG VHH WKDW WKHLU
IULHQGV ZKR WKH\¶YH ZRUNHG ZLWK IRU \HDUV KDYH QRZ JRQH ± SXW RQ D 3,3 GLGQ¶W
improve, compromise agreement and gone. I am not saying that it is only our older 
members who are getting this, but I agree with [Manchester Delegate] that it very 
often is. (CWU Branch Secretary, Birmingham, 25 May 2010)         
At CWU Annual Conferences (2010, 2011) motions were passed condemning PM and 
committing the union to action. Speaking in support of these motions, several delegates 
stressed the disproportionate effects on older workers. The following extract is typical.  
I would say that more than half the performance appeals I have done and all, except 
one, of managed exits have involved older workers. When I say older, I mean 50 or 
over. Five years ago, I never ever had these cases. There would be a random 
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occasional performance discipline case but it was not age-related. Now there is a 
definite pattern where older workers get whacked as underperformers, put on a PIP 
«,W¶VOLNHEHLQJSXWLQDVLORWKH\¶UHVWXFNFDQ¶WLPSURYHWKHPVHOYHV«ZHDUHWKHLU
last line of defence beforHWKH\JHWGRQHRQFDSDELOLW\7HOFRLVUXLQLQJWKHVHSHRSOH¶V
lives. (CWU Rep Delegate Manchester, 25 May 2010) 
Analysis of CWU conference agendas between 2010-2012 shows how widespread opposition 
to 7HOFR¶VPM had become. For example, motion number 54 to the 2011 Conference referred 
WR µGLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶ towards older workers, while motion number 55 condemned Telco for 
XVLQJµXQGHUSHUIRUPLQJ¶ and compromise agreements to µV\VWHPDWLFDOO\PDQDJHSHRSOHRXW
RIWKHEXVLQHVV¶The proposer of motion 56 described how PM KDGEHFRPHPRUHµGUDFRQLDQ
DQG LQIOH[LEOH¶ and that good hard-ZRUNLQJ ROGHU PHPEHUV µwho perform well above 
H[SHFWHGVWDQGDUGVDUHIHDUIXOIRUDOODVSHFWVRIWKHLUHYHU\GD\ZRUNLQJOLIH¶.     
A key informant was the National Officer responsible for negotiating with Telco, who 
reported the recurring characteristic of the cases they appealed was that they involved older 
workers. In one high-profile instance, action was threatened to prevent the termination of a 
long-serving and respected field engineer.     
We did escalate the case of xxx but Telco did not compromise. +H¶VEHHQ done for 
quantity, for not doing enough jobs, but he's an excellent, thorough engineer, and 
everyone knows he is. Whenever his colleagues are in trouble, they call him to solve 
their technical problems«he would always take the difficult job, see it through. He 
was committed to doing a good job, but because of PM he was deemed to be not 
quick enough. As recently as even six or seven years ago, the older skilled engineers 
like xxxx were treated well enough. Since then the pressure on them has grown and 
grown (CWU National Negotiating Officer). 
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The question prompted by these reported experiences is the extent to which an underlying 
organizational purpose has animated 7HOFR¶VSUDFWLFHs. All those CWU respondents (10 out 
of 15) who saw age as an important factor, believed that older workers were being 
deliberately targeted as a prelude to being put on a PIP and then exited after unsatisfactory 
improvement. Supporting evidence exists.  
First, a Prospect rep (and former HR manager) provided µLQVLGHU¶ testimony of 
changed PM practice. ,Q KHU VHFWLRQ RI  HQJLQHHUV QLQH ZHUH µPDQDJHG RXW¶ RQ
SHUIRUPDQFHJURXQGVDQH[LWUDWHµZRUQE\KHUVHQLRUPDQDJHUDVDEDGJHRIKRQRXU¶ 
Later in 2008 a new Director was appointed [for Telco section] with responsibility for 
field engineers. We were told we were not moving people out quickly enough.  
Managers had what was basically a fortnightly inquisition on how effectively they 
were dealing with sickness absence cases and underperformers. Managers were given 
targets on how many people should be exited. 7KHPHVVDJHZDVFOHDUµ,I\RXGRQ¶W
manage people out of the organization, theQ \RX ZLOO JHW PDQDJHG RXW \RXUVHOI¶ It 
was never openly articulated but was as explicit as it could be that it was older 
workers being targeted. They wanted to remove people on grounds of capability and 
performance without having to pay their pensions. (ex-Human Resource Manager, 
Prospect)  
Second, CWU was able to access a spreadsheet that confirms Telco¶V focus on older 
employees. The most revealing page is reproduced (Table 3).
ii
 The staff listed are team 
leaders/supervisors selected from the wider population of a particular region as being suitable 
LHµSRWHQWLDO¶FDVHVIRUFRPSURPLVHDJUHHPHQWVand managed exit. The page is essentially 
a planning tool, making quarterly projections across the forthcoming year of targeted 
individuals 7KH µOLNeOLKRRG¶ FROXPQ contains a percentage figure against each individual 
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which reflects senior manager evaluations of this objective being realized.
iii
 TKH µQRWHV¶ 
column records in cursory narrative the actions against the identified staff and the rationale. 
While age is not the sole reason for action against individuals, it certainly is prominent. 
Explicit reference is made to age in 11 of the 23 cases.  Nor is poor or under-performance, 
however defined, consistently used as a rationale for the targeting of individuals. Eight of the 
listed staff were GHHPHG WR EH µ$FKLHYLQJ 6WDQGDUGV¶ (AS) and only two were 
underperforming (U). In three additional cases where managers were obligated to proceed 
with compromise agreement discussions, it was acknowledged that µno current performance 
issues¶ existed. In at least two cases, managers were expected to facilitate the removal of staff 
who had medical conditions, even though no performance grounds were cited.  
 
7 Discussion  
The findings, first, demonstrate the use of EPM in retail banks and telecommunications 
across functions and levels (Research Question 1). A majority of interviewees reported that 
performance indicators increasingly relied on quantitative targets; for example, EPM enabled 
WKH µWLJKWO\ WLPHG¶ DQG FRQVWDQWO\ PRQLWRUHG MREV RI WKH WHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQV HQJLQHHUV
Respondents also reported the use of forced distribution rating systems (FDRS) based on 
EPM data to manage underperformers, confirming other reports RI )'56V¶ JURZLQJ XVH
(Houldsworth and Jirasinghe, 2006).  
Second, there was consistent evidence across sectors and cases that older workers 
were vulnerable with respect to EPM and punitive PM (Research Question 2). Respondents 
reported an increase in disciplinary hearings and dismissals brought to the union from older 
workers, particularly women, who were more likely to have health or family demands. These 
employees were more at risk of being labelled underperforming. Quantifiable performance 
measures (e.g. volume) and the operation of age stereotypes (e.g. about health and 
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performance) appeared to drive this practice. While stereotyping in appraisals cannot be 
confirmed with our data, other research confirms few age differences with respect to 
quantitative performance criteria (Ng and Feldman, 2012). Moreover, managers based 
decisions on proxies of objective measures that were not directly related to task performance; 
e.g., absence, timekeeping, extra effort.  
What is compelling about the evidence is the similarity of PM processes and 
outcomes across our two sectors and the banking case studies. This pattern reinforces the 
relevance of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), and in particular the 
adoption of common technologies which reconfigured work organization in retail banks with 
the purpose of driving efficiencies, and maximizing profits and shareholder value. Our 
evidence shows that digitally generated data of diverse kinds produced the metrics 
upon which individual targets, ultimately, were constructed and against which employees 
were evaluated. The processes were remarkably similar within and across the four banks in 
call centres, back office and even elsewhere amongst supervisory and technical grades. So 
too was there comparability in the ensuing PM policies, the treatment of underperformers and 
the effects for older workers. In Telco, the clerical and engineering experience demonstrated 
similar effects in contrasting work contexts. 
Together, the findings provide one of the first indications of how EPM is used within 
the wider organizational context of PM, and identify older workers as potentially vulnerable 
to such performance evaluations. Although EPM provides ostensibly objective and hence 
more valid measures of individual performance, it still may not guard against the occurrence 
of age stereotypes or attributional bias in performance appraisal or eliminate discrimination 
when this data is used as part of a PM process designed to address wider organizational 
objectives. Research already cautions that it should be used only for developmental purposes 
given its potentially negative attitudinal and emotional consequences for employees (McNall 
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and Roch, 2007). Our evidence suggests that EPM is being used in technologically-intensive 
work settings to drive PM in a manner contrary to best practice. EPM is shown to increase 
stress-related illness (Stanton, 2000), which is consistent with the reported cases related to 
stress caused by PM in our study.  
FDRS also was viewed as procedurally unjust and frequently based on metrics which 
encouraged stereotypes regarding the capabilities of older workers. These stereotypes, for 
example, regarding health, are not supported by studies wKLFKLQGLFDWHWKDWµZRUNDELOLW\¶FDQ
be sustained in late-career employees given a supportive work environment (Härmä, 2011). 
Not only does our study highlight the dangers of an increasingly intensified, technologically-
driven performance culture, it suggests that age stereotypes are encouraging managed exit 
from the workplaces. 
A final FRQWULEXWLRQ LV WR SUHVHQW D YLHZ RI ROGHU ZRUNHUV¶ H[SHULHQFHV ZKLFK LV QRW
conventionally acknowledged in the HRM literature, particularly with respect to the relatively 
recent impact of e-HRM. HRM literature traditionally encourages employers to adopt formal 
HR practices, such as frequent performance appraisal for non-managerial employees, as part 
of a positive, developmental relationship-building process (Armstrong, 2009). Our findings 
reflect a darker side of such benign indicators of HR and technology adoption, particularly 
with respect to age discrimination. Specifically, PM demonstrated in this study stands in 
direct contrast to the frequently cited imperatives to extend working lives and encourage 
supportive, age-aware HRM practices (Kooij, et al., 2013).  
 
8 Conclusions and implications 
Policymakers have encouraged employers to adapt workplaces and HRM to meet the needs 
of different generations. Age-aware PM typically recommends dialogue and agreement 
between managers and employees towards achieving aligned objectives. Our results, 
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however, reflect the growing pervasiveness of EPM in technologically-intensive service work 
and its use for punitive PM, potentially in a discriminatory way. Appropriately positioned 
HRM can prevent unintended discriminatory practices or biased managerial perceptions. Yet, 
this has not prevented the emergence of controversial practices, such as FDRSs, despite 
concerns regarding their legality and effects on employee attitudes (Bass and Green, 2014; 
Blume, et al., 2009). 
Of further concern is that age discrimination remains an issue in an environment of 
recession and greater competition for jobs (Rothenberg and Gardner, 2011). Furthermore, 
current observed changes in the demographic composition of the workforce are not 
temporary. Our study presents one potential prospect for the future; that HRM policies and 
practices driven by increasingly technologically-intensive work processes and ever more 
readily available digitized metrics become less, rather than more, aligned to the needs of a 
multigenerational and increasingly aging workforce. 
These issues require multistakeholder attention, not least from policymakers who 
promote extending working lives while also reacting to issues concerning pension entitlement 
and less easily accessible early retirement routes. Employers cannot be assumed to be 
forthcoming, as revealed by reported increases in cases involving punitive PM presented to 
the unions by their members. Future research should attempt to gain additional perspectives 
(from employers and employees) to enable EPM data to be used in a way that is mutually 
satisfying and protects vulnerable groups from adverse impact. For example, EPM may also 
disadvantage those with disabilities. Trades unions, who already face conflicting pressures 
with respect to age policy (e.g. protecting pension entitlement, negotiating strategies for 
easing unemployment) now are faced with what appears to be a further social challenge in 
terms of age equality.  
Table 1. 
27 
 
Research participants 
 
Organization Union/Interviewee 
 Unite the Union (Finance Sector) 
 National Secretary 1  
 National Secretary 2  
Bank A  National Officer  
 Senior Rep  
 Workplace Rep  
 Senior Rep 
Bank B  National Officer  
 Workplace Rep  
 Workplace Rep 
Bank C  Senior Rep 
 Workplace Rep  
 Workplace Rep  
Bank D Senior  Rep  
 Workplace Rep  
 Senior Rep  
Telecoms (Telco) Communication Workers Union 
 Regional Officer 1 
 National Organizer 
 Clerical Branch Officer  
 National Officer 1  
 National Officer 2  
 National Officer 3  
 National Officer 4  
 Branch Secretary 1  
 Branch Secretary 2  
 National Organizer  
 National Officer and Negotiator (CWU) 
 Senior National Officer (CWU) 
 Prospect 
 Ex-Human Resource Manager (Prospect) 
 National Officer (Prospect) 
 Research Officer (Prospect) 
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Table 2. 
Union Conferences and Seminars 
 
Union/Company Event 
Unite the Union National Reps Meeting, Wortley Hall** 
 Regional Finance and Legal Committee, Glasgow* 
 Unite National Industrial Committee ± Finance Sector, London** 
 Finance Sector, Change at Work Seminar, Eastbourne** 
 National Finance and Legal Sector Conference, Brighton*** 
 Change at Work Seminar ** 
 Finance Sector, Change at Work Seminar, Eastbourne** 
 Alliance for Finance, Glasgow** 
Bank A National Committee, Glasgow* 
 National Reps Conference, Glasgow** 
 Global Conference, Glasgow** 
Bank B National Reps Meeting, Glasgow** 
 National Reps Meeting, Glasgow** 
Bank C National Reps Conference, Manchester** 
 National Reps Conference, Eastbourne**  
 National Reps Seminar, Eastbourne** 
CWU Telecoms Executive, London* 
 1DWLRQDO2UJDQLVHUV¶0HHWLQJ0DQFKHVWHU 
 National Conference, Bournemouth** 
 National Conference, Bournemouth** 
 6ZDQVHDDQG7KH9DOOH\V%UDQFKHV¶0HPEHUV0HHWLQJ6ZDQVHD 
 Telecoms National Executive Meeting* 
 Telecoms National Delegates Meeting*  
 
Note. *PM (performance management) as a single agenda item, ** PM subject of dedicated 
session(s), *** PM significant topic of debate 
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Table 3. 
Individuals targeted for Compromise Agreements and Managed Exits (Telco) 
 
  
Year 
   
Name Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Last/Next 
Review 
Likelihood  
Notes 
XXXXX    Potential  80% Approx 59 years old skilled. Currently AS
1
. Manager to discuss CA
2
 by 14/6/year 
XXXXX   Potential   80% One to watch has had quality issues and successfully completed plan. 3/6/year 
currently AS may have taken a package if offered last year. Manager to discuss CA 
21/06/year 
XXXXX Agreed     100% Agreed May [year] 
 
XXXXX   Potential     Approx 66 years. Performance plan agreed pending increase in [type of] work as 
agreed by NC and OC. Manager to discuss CA by 14/6/year 
XXXXX    Potential  85% 2Q UDGDUKDV FRPSOHWHG\HDUV¶ VHUYLFH2IIHUHG&$EXW UHIXVHG 0DUFK\HDU
Manager again to discuss CA by 14/6/year. 
XXXXX    Potential  50% Recently completed plan, now picking up [type of work], monitoring progress will 
be potential managed exit if progress is not maintained. Manager to discuss CA at 
next 1-1 21/06/year  
XXXXX    Potential  50% Currently performing at AS. Manager again to discuss CA by 21/06/year 
 
XXXXX    Potential   50% Currently performing at AS. 3/6/year performance plan pending increase in [type of 
work] as advised by NC and OC. Manager to discuss CA by 14/06/year. 
XXXXX   Potential   60% New manager. 3/6/year. Currently AS. Manager to discuss. Currently on S/L 
 
XXXXX   Potential    60% New manager. Came in from [area of work]. Failed informal plan. Completed 
formal plan before coming across. Currently AS manager to discuss CA by 
14/06/year 
XXXXX    Potential  60% Aged 60 3/6/year currently AS. Manager to discuss CA by 14/06/year. 
 
XXXXX   Potential   80% Aged 53 currently U, new to team. TE to investigate performance plan situation by 
21/6/year. Current manager has discussed CA answer No. Target is 6 months to 
managed exit.  
XXXXX   Potential   80% Aged ? Based in [city], currently U, new to team. TE to investigate performance 
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Year 
   
Name Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Last/Next 
Review 
Likelihood  
Notes 
plan situation by 21/6/year. Manager has discussed CA answer No. Target is 6 
months to managed exit. 
XXXXX    Potential   80% Aged 62. TE to investigate performance plan situation by 21/6/year. Current 
manager has discussed CA answer No. Target is 6 months to managed exit. 
XXXXX   Potential   80% New to team. Now beginning plan with myself and PR. Target is 6 months to 
managed exit. 
XXXXX  Potential    90% Aged 62, manager has discussed CA, wants to go HR to contact individual.  
 
XXXXX  Potential    70% Aged 62 starting a coaching plan. Manager to discuss CA next 1-1. 
 
XXXXX    Potential  100% Aged 58. TC to discuss CA potential by 14/06/year. TC spoke to Len, will 
definitely take CA in Q4 subject to being able to agree terms (needs 6 months) 
XXXXX  Potential    85% Liver condition may be medical retirement. 3/6/year no issues at present, could 
deteriorate, will progress as managed exit with a view to medical retirement if 
performance is affected 
XXXXX    Potential  80% 3DUNLQVRQ¶V QR SHUIRUPDQFH LVVXHV WR GDWH GUDZLQJ SHQVLRQ DJHG  0DQDJHU
again to discuss CA by 21/06/year.  
XXXXX     Potential  60% AS performer now reaching retirement age, manager to discuss CA to gauge 
interest by 14/06/year. 
XXXXX  Potential    80% States work making him ill manager monitoring. 3/6/year no current performance 
issues, has been asked to complete [performance development plan]. Manager to 
discuss CA by 14/06/year. 
XXXXX   Potential   50% Came across from [team] is currently travelling 1.5 hrs to work each way also had 
performance issues with role, being coached, manager to discuss CA to gauge 
interest 14/06/year. 
Notes.   
1
AS=Achieves Standards; 
2
CA=Compromise Agreement 
 
 
31 
 
References 
$UPVWURQJ 0  µ7KH SURFHVV RI SHUIRUPDQFH PDQDJHPHQW¶ LQ 0 $UPVWURQJ A 
Handbook of Human Resource Management, London; Kogan Page, 617-638. 
Armstrong-6WDVVHQ0DQG&DWWDQHR-µ7KHHIIHFWRIGRZQVL]LQJRQRUJDQL]DWLRQDO
SUDFWLFHVWDUJHWLQJROGHUZRUNHUV¶, Journal of Management Development, 29(4): 344-
363. 
BDLQ3:DWVRQ$0XOYH\*7D\ORU3DQG*DOO*µ7D\ORULVPtargets and the 
quantity-quality dichotomy in call centres, New Technology, Work and Employment, 
17(3): 154-169 
%DVV'DQG*UHHQ -  µ0LFURVRIW D[HVEHOOFXUYH IRUHPSOR\HHJUDGLQJ LQPRYH WR
IRVWHU JUHDWHU WHDPZRUN FROODERUDWLRQ¶ Bloomberg News, 13 November 2014. 
http://business.financialpost.com/2013/11/13microsoft-axes-bell-curve-for-emplyees 
Accessed 03/03/2014  
Batt, R. and 0R\QLKDQ /  µ7KH YLDELOLW\ RI DOWHUQDWLYH FDOO FHQWUH SURGXFWLRQ
PRGHOV¶ Human Resource Management Journal, 12(4): 14-34. 
%OXPH%'%DOGZLQ77DQG5XELQ56µ5HDFWLRQVWRGLIIHUHQW W\SHVRIIRUFHG
distribution performance evaluatLRQ V\VWHPV¶ Journal of Business and Psychology, 
24: 77-91. 
Bol, J.C. and Smith, S.D. (2011) Spillover effects in subjective performance evaluation: Bias 
and the asymmetric influence of controllability. The Accounting Review, 86(4): 1213-
1230. 
Boreham, P., Parker, R., Thompson, P. and Hall, R. (2008) New Technology@Work. London: 
Routledge 
&DUWHU5'DQIRUG$+RZFURIW'5LFKDUGVRQ+6PLWK$DQG7D\ORU3µ$OO
they lack is a chain": lean and the New Performance Management in the British civil 
service', New Technology, Work and Employment, 26(2): 83-97. 
CIPD (2011) Conflict Management Survey Report. London: CIPD Publications. 
&R[ &% DQG %DLHU 0(  µ7RR ROG WR WUDLQ RU UHSULPDQG 7KH UROH RI LQWHUJURXS
attribution ELDVLQHYDOXDWLQJROGHUZRUNHUV¶, Journal of Business Psychology, 29(1): 
61-70. 
CWU (2010) Telecoms and Financial Services Conference±Agenda, 25 May, London: CWU 
CWU (2011) Telecoms and Financial Services Conference±Agenda, 24-26 May, London: 
CWU  
CWU (2014) Voice, Wimbledon: CWU, July-August 
Danford, A., Richardson, M. and Upchurch, M. (2003) New Unions±New Workplace, 
London: Routledge 
DiMaggio, P.J. DQG3RZHOO::µ7KHLURQFDJHUHYLVLWHGLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVRPRUSKLVP
DQG FROOHFWLYH UDWLRQDOLW\ LQ RUJDQL]DWLRQDO ILHOGV¶ American Sociological Review, 
48(2): 147-160  
EHRC (2010) Working Better: The Over 50s The New Work Generation, London: Equality 
and Human Rights Commission. 
Green, F. (2006) Demanding Work: The Paradox of Job Quality in the Affluent Economy, 
Woodstock: Princeton University Press 
Härmä, M.  µ$GGLQJ PRUH \HDUV WR WKH ZRUN FDUHHUV RI DQ DJLQJ ZRUNIRUFH ± what 
ZRUNV"¶ Scandinavian Journal of Work Environment and Health, 37(6): 451-453. 
Houldsworth, E. and Jirasinghe, D. (2006) Managing and Measuring Employee Performance, 
Kogan Page Publishers. 
+RZFURIW'DQG5LFKDUGVRQ+µ7KHEDFNRIILFHJRHVJOREDOH[SORULQg connections 
DQGFRQWUDGLFWLRQVLQVKDUHGVHUYLFHFHQWUHV¶, Work, Employment and Society, 26(2): 
111-137. 
32 
 
.RRLM'7*XHVW'(&OLQWRQ0.QLJKW7-DQVHQ3*	'LNNHUV-6µ+RZ
the impact of HR practices on employee wellǦbeing and performance changes with 
DJH¶ Human Resource Management Journal, 23(1):18-35. 
/DWKDP * 3 DQG 0DQQ 6  µ$GYDQFHV LQ WKH VFLHQFH RI SHUIRUPDQFH DSSUDLVDO
,PSOLFDWLRQV IRU SUDFWLFH¶ International Review of Industrial and Organizational 
Psychology, 21, 295. 
/DZOHU((µ5HZDUGSUDFWLFHVDQGSHUIRUPDQFHPDQDJHPHQWV\VWHPHIIHFWLYHQHVV¶
Organizational Dynamics, 32(4): 396-404.   
/RUHWWR:DQG:KLWH3µ(PSOR\HUV¶DWWLWXGHVSUDFWLFHVDQGSROLFLHVWRZDUGVROGHU
ZRUNHUV¶, Human Resource Management Journal, 16(3): 313±330.  
Manfred, S. and Vickers, L. (2013) µMeeting the challenge of active ageing in the workplace; 
Is the abolition of the retirement age the answer?¶European Labour Law Journal, 
4(4): 250-70. 
McNall, L. A. and Roch, 6*µ(IIHFWVRIHOHFWURQLFPRQLWRULQJW\SHVRQSHUFHSWLRQV
RI SURFHGXUDO MXVWLFH LQWHUSHUVRQDO MXVWLFH DQG SULYDF\¶ Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, 37: 658±682. 
0LQGD*µ2SSRUWXQLVWLFGRZQVL]LQJRIDJLQJZRUNHUV7KHVYHUVLRn of age and 
SHQVLRQGLVFULPLQDWLRQLQHPSOR\PHQW¶48 Hastings L.J. 511 1996-1997. 
0LR]]R 0 DQG 6RHWH /  µ,QWHUQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQ RI VHUYLFHV D WHFKQRORJLFDO
SHUVSHFWLYH¶ Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 67(2): 159-185 
Ng, T.W.H. and )HOGPDQ '&  µ7KH UHODWLRQVKLS RI DJH WR WHQ GLPHQVLRQV RI MRE
SHUIRUPDQFH¶Journal of Applied Psychology, 93(2):392-423.  
1J 7:+ DQG )HOGPDQ '&  µ(YDOXDWLQJ VL[ FRPPRQ VWHUHRW\SHV DERXW ROGHU
workers with meta-DQDO\WLFDOGDWD¶Personnel Psychology, 65: 821-858.  
1LHVVHQ & 6ZDURZVN\ & DQG /HL] 0  µ$JH DQG DGDSWDWLRQ WR FKDQJHV LQ WKH
ZRUNSODFH¶, Journal of Managerial Psychology, 25: 356-383. 
2VERUQH 7 DQG 0F&DQQ /$  µ)RUFHG UDQNLQJ DQG DJH-related employment 
GLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶Human Rights, 31: 6-9 
3DUU\(DQG6WURKPHLHU6µ+50LQWKHGLJLWDODJH± digital changes and challenges 
RIWKH+5SURIHVVLRQ¶Employee Relations, 36(4), pp.±(Earlycite). 
Pawson, R. and Tilly, N. (1997) Realistic Evaluation, Sage: London. 
3HUU\(/DQG)LQNHOVWHLQ/0µ7RZDUGDEURDGHUYLHZRIDJHGLVFULPLQDWLRQLQ
employment-related decisions: A joint consideration of organizational factors and 
FRJQLWLYHSURFHVVHV¶, Human Resource Management Review, 9(1): 21-49. 
3RVWKXPD 5$ DQG &DPSLRQ 0$  µ$JH VWHUHRW\SHV LQ WKH ZRUNSODFH FRPPRQ
VWHUHRW\SHV PRGHUDWRUV DQG IXWXUH UHVHDUFK GLUHFWLRQV¶ Journal of Management, 
35(1): 158-188. 
Prospect (2013) Performance Management System in Telco. 3URVSHFW¶V 2013 Survey, 
London: Propsect. 
3XODNRV (' DQG 2¶/HDU\ 56  µ:K\ LV SHUIRUPDQFH PDQDJHPHQW EURNHQ"¶ The 
Industrial and Organizational Psychologist, 4, 146±164. 
Rauschenbach, C., Göritz, A.S., and Hertel, G.  µAge stereotypes about emotional 
UHVLOLHQFHDWZRUN¶ Educational Gerontology, 38(8): 511-519. 
5REURHN6-6FKXULQJ0&URH]HQ66WDWWLQ0DQG%XUGRUI$µ3RRUKHDOWK
unhealthy behaviors, and unfavorable work characteristics influence pathways of exit 
from paid employment among older workers in Europe: a four year follow-up 
study¶ Scandinavian Journal of Work, Environment and Health, 39(2). 
5RWKHQEHUJ-=DQG*DUGQHU'6µ3URWHFWLQJROGHUZRUNHUVWhe failure of the Age 
'LVFULPLQDWLRQ LQ (PSOR\PHQW $FW RI ¶, Journal of Sociology and Social 
Welfare, 38: 9-30. 
33 
 
5\DQ *: DQG %HUQDUG +5  µ'DWD PDQDJHPHQW DQG DQDO\VLV PHWKRGV¶ LQ 1.
Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln (eds), Handbook of Qualitative Research, Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage. 
Stanton, J. M. (2000). µReactions to employee performance monitoring: Framework, review, 
and research directions¶ Human Performance, 13: 85±113.  
6WURKPHLHU 6  ³&RQFHSWV RI H-HRM consequences: a categorization, review and 
VXJJHVWLRQ´ International Journal of Human Resource Management, 20(3): 528-543. 
6WURKPHLHU 6 DQG .DEVW 5  µ2UJDQL]DWLRQDO DGRSWLRQ RI H-HRM in Europe: An 
HPSLULFDOH[SORUDWLRQRIPDMRUDGRSWLRQIDFWRUV¶Journal of Managerial Psychology, 
24(6): 482±501. 
Taylor, P. (2013) Performance Management and the New Workplace Tyranny, Report for 
Scottish Trades Union Congress, Glasgow. 
7D\ORU 3 DQG %DLQ 3  µ&DOO FHQWUH UHIOHFWLRQV D UHSO\ WR *OXFNVPDQQ¶ Work, 
Employment and Society 21(2): 349-362. 
7KRPSVRQ 3  µ7KH WURXEOH ZLWK +50¶, Human Resource Management Journal. 
21(4): 355-367. 
Verint (2014) Workforce Management±Forecasting, Scheduling and More to Balance Your 
Workforce with Workload, http://www.verint.com/solutions/enterprise-workforce-
optimization/products/workforce-management/index, accessed 27 June 2014. 
Wells, D.L., Moorman, R.H., and Werner, J.M. (2007) µThe impact of the perceived purpose 
of electronic performance monitoring on an array of attitudinal variables¶ Human 
Resource Development Quarterly, 18: 121±138. 
:KLWH 0  µ2OGHU HPSOR\HHV XQGHU SUHVVXUH" 7KHRUL]LQJ UHDVRQV IRU GHFOLQLQJ
FRPPLWPHQW¶, Work, Employment and Society, 26(3):447-463.   
  
 
                                                 
i
 In the UK full-time officers or officials (FTOs) are paid employees who undertake diverse responsibilities on 
behalf of the union and its membership. The remit of an FTO can vary according to geography (national or 
regional level), by sector, industry or company, and/or by function (e.g. research, negotiation). Elected or lay 
positions are differentiated from FTOs in that they are elected representative of different kinds, including 
workplace, national [senior rep] or elected branch positions, such as secretary.  
ii
 Staff names have been redacted and details that might reveal the organization, function or location have been 
deleted or anonymized. 
iii
 A 100% figure shows that the individual had already formally agreed to leave and a 90% figure that the 
individual has indicated agreement. 
